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Abstract 
The decision to cease working is traditionally influenced by a wide set of socio-economic and 
environmental variables. In this paper, we study transitions out of work for 26 EU countries 
over the period 2004-2009 in order to investigate the determinants of retirement based on the 
Eurostat Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Applying standard survivor 
analysis tools to describe exits into retirement, we do not find any significant differences in 
the patterns into retirement between the average euro area and EU non-euro area countries. 
Moreover, we find that shifts into retirement have increased during the onset of the 2009 
economic and financial crisis. Income, together with flexible working arrangements, is found 
to be important as regards early retirement decisions, compared to retiring beyond the legal 
retirement age. Finally, we show that institutional measures (such as, state/health benefits, 
minimum retirement age) could not be sufficient alone if individuals withdraw earlier from 
the labour market due to a weakening of their health. Especially, these latter results are of 
importance for structural and macroeconomic policy, for instance, in increasing the 
employment of both people and hours worked against the background of population ageing. 
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Employment Duration and Shifts into 
Retirement in the EU 
 
1. Introduction 
Population ageing is expected to result in a slowdown of labour force growth 
and, later, into its contraction and change in composition, as projected by the 
“2012 Ageing Report” by the European Commission (2011). While it is 
accepted that the demographic shift will add to pressure on the sustainability 
of public finances in many European countries, the implications for the long-
term growth of the labour force are still open issues. If, on the one hand, 
labour demand is expected to be lower, owing to the shrinkage of the 
working age population, on the other hand, participation rates for certain age 
cohorts could increase as well given that working lives will be longer, 
foreseeing pension reforms. Both aspects prompt several policy questions on 
labour market developments; such as how to promote longer working lives or 
how to improve choices for those workers forced to continue to work late in 
their lives.  
Policy makers have been promoting the expansion of working lives finding 
measures to postpone the labour market activity. However, reflecting 
retirement patterns, the decision to enter retirement will no longer be a 
discrete choice: with some workers remaining fully in employment and/or 
others reducing the number of hours worked as they age (see also Hurd, 
1993). Therefore, understanding in greater details the motivations for 
retirement is key as it could assist the formulation of policies encouraging the 
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return of retirees to employment or decreasing the incentives of withdrawing 
earlier from the labour market. 
Workers are often assumed to dace the choice of leaving the labour market 
based on their own preferences (Fengler, 1975; Hayward, Grady and 
McLaughlin, 1988) and/or based on the trade-off between market work versus 
home production or leisure (for an overview see Duggan, 1984; Bazzoli 1985; 
Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999; Duval 2003; Gruber and Wise 2002; Meghir and 
Whitehouse 1997). This latter specification has been particularly supported in 
modern micro-founded models (e.g., of the New Keynesian type) for 
macroeconomic analysis. In practice, however, different constraints can 
influence the labour force participation decisions of the elderly.  
In this paper a wide set of socio-economic and environmental variables is 
employed to study exits into retirement in the EU. Based on longitudinal data 
from the Eurostat Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) – 
covering the period 2004-2009 – we analyse the probability of retiring at a 
given age, given that the person has not retired yet. In particular, we study 
transitions from employment into (early) retirement by using a hazard based 
duration model framework (see also Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Hagan, 
Jones and Rice, 2009; Jones, Rice and Roberts, 2010).  
The contribution of this paper can be gauged under two perspectives. First, 
we provide, for the first time, results for a large set of 26 EU countries, by 
providing a systematic, conditional approach to estimate labour market shifts 
into retirement. Secondly, we exploit cross country differences, including 
measures of between-country heterogeneity, in quantifying the size and the 
speed with which employment-to-retirement changes took place.  
Since it would be natural to hypothesize upfront that retirement dynamics has 
changed over time – especially during 2009, reflecting the extent to which the 
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global economic and financial crisis hit in most countries – and differs across 
euro area versus non-euro area countries – reflecting region-specific dynamics 
and institutional set ups – we model this explicitly. Nonetheless, the results in 
this paper do not support any significant differences in the patterns into 
retirement between the average euro area and EU non-euro area countries. 
However, shifts into retirement seem to have increased during the onset of 
the 2009 crisis, when controlling for income.  
Turning to personal and household-level characteristics, income and benefits 
(also temporary in nature, e.g., sickness benefits) are found to be important as 
regards early retirement decisions – when accumulated income/wealth is 
presumably lower – compared to retiring beyond the legal retirement age. In 
the same vein, flexible working arrangements are found to be important in 
order to keep people at work beyond the legal retirement age, thus suggesting 
that making use of partial working schemes could modify retirement patterns 
towards postponing the labour market withdrawal.  
Finally, this analysis shows that institutional measures (such as, state/health 
benefits, minimum retirement age) could not be sufficient alone if individuals 
withdraw earlier from the labour market due to a weakening of their health. 
Particularly, for early retirees, policies aimed at improving the health of the 
workforce and at keeping people who experience health problems active may 
be crucial.  
Particularly, these latter results have implications for the effectiveness of 
active labour market policies, by getting retired people back into work or 
helping the prolongation of long term employment spells. Moreover, the 
findings are of importance for structural and macroeconomic policy, for 
example, in increasing the employment of both people and hours worked 
against the background of population ageing. 
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The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the 
data and provides a brief descriptive analysis. Section 3 presents the 
econometric strategy. Section 4 outlines the main results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
In this paper we use the Eurostat Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC) which consist of a database available in yearly frequencies, based 
on a rotating panel of longitudinal data for 4 sub-samples. The EU-SILC 
provides the longest time series of comparable and consistently defined 
individual level data for income and living conditions available for the EU, 
and our sample consists of 26 countries covering the period 2004-2009. The 
sample excludes Germany owing to data unavailability.1 Compared to other 
surveys, the EU-SILC provides not only details on each individual’s personal 
characteristics (i.e. gender, age, marital status, education, family composition, 
etc.), but also information on the level of (household) income prior to retiring 
and measures of the individual’s wealth status. This represents an advantage 
compared to other analyses, given that income and wealth can be important 
determinants of retirement decisions (see for instance, Hanoch and Honig, 
1983; Mitchel and Fields, 1984; Dugan, 1984; Ruhm, 1990).2 
An individual’s transition from employment into retirement is the event of 
interest in this study. From the EU-SILC, we construct transitions from 
                                                        1 Germany is covered by EU-SILC but their longitudinal micro data are not disseminated according to the EC Regulation no. 223/2009. 2 Overall, however, the EU-SILC is not designed to distinguish between job transitions and short retirement spells during the working life. Yet, although there exists an observed retirement framework based around state pension eligibility in each country (see OECD, 2011), people make transitions into and out of work until advanced ages, making observed employment histories rather complex.  
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employment to retirement, or of remaining in employment, based on each 
respondent’s current and past activity status. 
Moving from employment to retirement, or retiring in the next period, is 
typically referred to as a ‘failure’ event which can occur at any point in time 
after an ‘onset of risk’ period is defined. Here, the ‘onset of risk’ period is 
defined as each individual’s first entry into the labour market. 
To analyse transitions from employment into retirement, a hazard based 
duration model framework is employed (see, Diamond and Hausman, 1984; 
Hagan, Jones and Rice, 2009; Jones, Rice and Roberts, 2010). This allows 
modelling the length of time spent at work before moving into retirement. 
The dependent variable is thus the amount of time that an individual spends 
in employment before entering retirement (i.e. employment duration).3 
One statistical motivation for employing a duration analysis framework 
includes the presence of censored and left-truncated data. In practice, not all 
observations’ full history is observed until the ‘failure’ event. This naturally 
classifies the EU-SILC data as right-censored. Instead, the left truncation 
problem refers to the fact that individuals become at risk or even fail before 
we can enrol them in the study (see Figure 1).  
 
 
                                                        3 In Table A3 in the Appendix we detail the variables used in the estimation.  
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Left truncation is a natural feature of our data and involves the impossibility 
of tracking individuals over the whole working life. Taking into account this 
particular data structure, an individual’s full employment history is inferred 
based on retrospective information about the age at which he / she first 
started to work and the years spent on paid work. This formalisation does not 
clearly take into account the possibility of multiple ‘failure’ events within the 
same employment history, but rather assumes that each individual’s working 
history is continuous until retirement. 
In the same vein, individuals can enter the observation period / being enrolled 
in the study upon having already retired. Here, an important difference 
compared to standard duration analyses is that the failure event does not 
represent a rationale for an individual to drop out of sample (e.g., as death). 
Whenever enrolment occurs conditional on a previous retirement event (see 
Figure 1: Examples of left truncation in the EU-SILC data 
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Figure 1(b)), there may exist a positive difference between employment 
duration and the year of enrolment in the study, representing a gap of 
information about each individual’s activity between the period he / she 
ceased working and the period he / she became under observation. Only those 
with a gap < |G|, where G is arbitrarily chosen, as well as those reporting to 
have most recently changed their activity status ‘from employment to 
retirement’  are considered in this analysis. The gap variable is however not 
restricted to be exactly zero, i.e. G = 3, allowing for reporting errors in (i) age, 
(ii) age of the first job and (iii) the number of years spent on paid work. 
Importantly, this is not found to significantly affect our results, as the 
inclusion of a whole set of covariates in the regressions will anyway require 
censoring on many of these individuals with 0 < gap < |G|,4  
As individuals’ working histories are inferred based on retrospective 
questions, only the last spells are considered, for individuals employed at all 
times. Conversely, only the spell of retirement is considered for individuals 
retired in the sample. This allows data tractability in such a duration analysis 
framework. 
The dataset employed consists of 209.183 individuals. Out of this number, 
6756 individuals, that is just over 3% of the sample, are observed retiring. As 
Table 1 suggests, the majority of these retirees ceased working at the age of 55 
or later. Women represent nearly 40% of the sample.  
 
                                                         4 The analysis in the empirical section requires individuals to be observed at least for two consecutive periods (t-1 and t). For instance, an individual retired at time t, should provide information on his previous (t-1) employment status (be it part time or full time employment) or the occupation sector in which he / she most recently worked prior to retiring. Thus, when individuals are enrolled upon having retired, information on previous employment status is clearly missing, making those individuals not eligible for the empirical analysis in Section 4. 
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Table 1: Retirees by age group and gender   Percent of all observations Age Groups Males Females Total     Age 0 to 24 0.1 0.1 0.1 Age 25 to 29 0.2 0.1 0.2 Age 30 to 34 0.2 0.2 0.2 Age 35 to 39 0.4 0.4 0.4 Age 40 to 44 1.3 0.8 1.1 Age 45 to 49 2.6 1.9 2.3 Age 50 to 54 5.2 5.0 5.1 Age 55 to 59 25.0 40.7 31.0 Age 60 to 65 47.9 37.8 44.1 Age > 66 17.2 12.9 15.6 Total observations 4191 2565 6756 
Gender representation is reversed for ages between 55 and 59, where women 
represent the majority of the sample considered. In general, female workers 
retire earlier than males. Nearly 50% of female workers enter into retirement 
before the age of 60, compared to 35% of the male workers. 
In our sample, the age of retirement spans from a minimum of 20 years to a 
maximum of 80 years, with the average occurring at the age of 60.4 and the 
median at 60. Thus, the distribution of retirees is clearly skewed towards 
older people (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Distribution of retirees by age Percentiles   Smallest     1% 41 20   5% 50 20   10% 55 21 Obs 6756 25% 57 22         50% 60   Mean 60.453   Largest Std. Dev. 6.349 75% 64 80   90% 67 80 Variance 40.312 95% 70 80 Skewness -0.662 99% 78 80 Kurtosis 7.431 
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3. Empirical methodology 
In this paper we employ a hazard based duration model framework to study 
the transitions from employment into retirement. The main advantage of 
using duration analysis is that it allows modelling the length of time spent in 
a given state (i.e. employment) before moving into another state (i.e. 
retirement). Relative to other approaches such as those that focus on the 
unconditional probability of an event taking place (e.g. a probit or logit 
models), our focus here is on the conditional probability, or, the probability 
that the spell of one particular status (e.g., employment) will end in the next 
short interval of time, given that it has lasted until recently. 
As the analysis is concerned with the timing of the observed change from 
employment to retirement (or ‘failure’ event, see Section 2), it makes sense to 
conceptualize the length of each individual j’s employment spell as a random 
variable, Tj .5 Assuming Tj  has a continuous probability distribution )(tf , 
where t is a realisation of jT , the cumulative distribution function of T will be 
given by ∫=≤=
t
j ds)s(f)tTPr()t(F
0
. This says that the survival function for the 
j-th individual, or the probability that his employment spell T is of length at 
least equal to t, is: 
∫
∞
=>=−=
t
j ds)s(f)tTPr()t(F)t(S 1      (1) 
Conversely, the hazard rate (or instantaneous failure rate) for individual j at 
time t, is defined instead as the marginal probability of immediate retirement, 
conditional on not having retired before time t: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )tS
tf
tF
tftT|dttTtPth jj =−
=>+<<=
1
   (2) 
                                                        5 See Box-Steffensmeier and Sokhey (2010) and Jenkins (2008) for a methodological overview. 
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This class of models can be distinguished between non-parametric, semi-
parametric and full parametric models on the basis of whether they predict 
the probability distribution of a certain event by means of a set of additional 
covariates. While parametric models are widely used across numerous fields 
of economics, the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972; 1975) has 
proven particularly flexible. Compared to fully parametric approaches, a key 
benefit of this approach is that it allows to “avoid having to make 
assumptions about the nature of the duration times in the first place” (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). In other words, the Cox model makes no 
assumption about the shape of the hazard function or about how covariates 
may affect this shape.6 Thus, the Cox semi-parametric approach is regarded as 
a benchmark in this paper, whereas non-parametric (Section 4.1) and fully 
parametric (Appendix) approaches are employed for preliminary 
investigation of the data and robustness checks respectively.7 
In the Cox model, the hazard for the j-th individual in the data is assumed to 
be: 
( ) ( ) ( )jj xthxth β ′= exp| 0       (3) 
where β ′  is the vector of regression coefficients; x a vector of covariates 
which influence the hazard rate; and ( )th0  is the baseline hazard function.8 By 
default, the model assumes a baseline hazard that is common to all the 
individuals in the study population. In this way, covariates act 
multiplicatively on the baseline hazard, adding additional risks on an 
individual basis, as determined by the individuals' prognostic information.                                                         6 For further references see Cleves et al. (2010). 7 Fully parametric models will be efficient only as long as the distributional assumptions are appropriately chosen in the class of parametric lifetime distributions (e.g., exponential, weibull, gompertz, log-normal, log-logistic or gamma). Clearly, if the hazard function shape is incorrectly specified, parameters can be seriously biased. 8 In particular, when inference is dependent on the form of exp(β’x) but still independent of h0(t), one speaks of a semi-parametric model (see Cox; 1972, 1975). 
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This gives the model a simple and easily understood interpretation. The main 
idea behind it is the separation of the time effect in the baseline hazard 
function, on one side, and the effect of the covariates in an exponential term, 
on the other. In essence this assumption says that the hazard of failure at time 
t is related to individuals or groups of individuals by a proportionality 
constant which does not depend on t.  
 
3.1. Frailty models 
When observations are conditionally different in terms of their hazards due to 
unobserved heterogeneity, standard models, as the one just described, may 
lead to spurious duration dependence.9 Hence, fitting a normal duration 
model, e.g. equation (3), would simply not recognise that some observations 
are more ‘frail’ (or, failure prone) than others.  
A first possible solution would be to include fixed effects. However, it has 
been shown that fixed effects are not a viable alternative in this context, as 
there is an incidental parameter problem that leads to inconsistent and 
deflated standard errors (see Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001; Zorn, 2000). 
An alternative method is to use random effects or ‘frailty’ models instead. The 
basic idea behind frailty models is to introduce an additional random 
parameter into the hazard rate accounting exactly for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Frailties may be individual-specific or group-specific. Models 
constructed in terms of group-level frailties are typically referred to as 
‘shared’ frailty models because observations within a sub-group are assumed 
to share unmeasured risk factors prompting them to fail earlier.  
                                                        9 The notion of unobserved heterogeneity amounts here to observations being conditionally different in terms of their hazards in ways that are unaccounted for in the systematic part of the model. 
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Lancaster (1979) proposed a parametric mixed proportional hazard model, 
accounting for unobserved ‘frailties’, which is a generalization of Cox’s (1972) 
approach. This specifies the hazard rate for the j-th individual as (see also 
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Zorn, 2000):10 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jjj vxthxth expexp| 0 β ′=      (4) 
where ψjj Wv =  describes the individual- or group-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity. For identification purposes, the mean of v is typically 
normalized to unity and its variance is assumed to equal an (unknown) 
parameterθ .11 Compared to the standard Cox (1972) regression approach, 
integrating v  out leaves with the only problem of estimating the additional 
parameter,θ , in the survivor function:12 
  ∫∫ −=−=
tt
dsshvdsvshvtS
0
0
0
)(),()|(      (5)  
4. Results 
4.1. Non-parametric analysis 
In order to summarise the data and visualise the distribution shape of 
employment duration for the sample or for separate groups, non-parametric 
estimation of the survivor and hazard functions relying on product-limit 
                                                        10 In essence the concept goes back to the work of Greenwood and Yule (1920) on accident 
proneness. The term frailty itself was introduced by Vaupel et al. (1979) in univariate survival models. 11 As Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) note, we always make assumptions about whether we use frailty models or not. When we do not take account of frailty, we are essentially assuming that v=1 with probability 1. 12 To derive the expected value of the survivor function, a probability distribution for v needs to be specified. Albeit the gamma is the most common in the literature, any continuous distribution 
with positive support, a unit mean, and a finite variance θ – inverse Gaussian, log-normal etc.  would be appropriate. Essentially, as long as we assume that v has some distribution, we can estimate the frailty model by estimating the frailty variance term θ.  
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estimators are introduced.13 Table 3 reports the survivor and cumulative 
hazard function for employment duration. The survivor function shows the 
proportion of people who remain in employment (i.e. do not ‘fail’ by entering 
retirement) as time proceeds, while the cumulative hazard shows the 
expected number of ‘failures’ at each observed time. On average, after 40 
years of work, the survivor function starts decaying very rapidly, with the 
proportion of people still employed decreasing over time. This is in line with 
the idea that the definable pensionable age requires around 40 years of 
contribution, consistent with the evidence in OECD (2011) and European 
Commission (2011). Still, different conditions may apply depending on the 
number of years of contributions achieved at a certain date or the age of first 
entry into the pension system. 
As shown in Table 3, after 45 years of work the probability of remaining in 
employment is around 0.64, indicating that roughly 36% of the sampled 
individuals where retired. Furthermore, the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard 
suggests that the hazard of exiting into retirement increases monotonically.14 
Survivor functions from employment to retirement across different categories, 
as well as by country, are plotted in Figure A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
                                                         13 We use the Kaplan-Meier (1985) and the estimators dating back to Nelson (1972) and Aalen (1978) (referred to as Nelson-Aalen estimator) for the estimation of the survivor and cumulative hazard function respectively. For further details see also Kiefer (1988). 14 It is worth noting that for the survivor function and the cumulative hazard function, both the Kaplan-Meyer and the Nelson-Aalen estimators are consistent estimates of each function respectively, and their statistics are asymptotically equivalent (see Klein and Moeschberger, 2003).  
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Table 3: Kaplan-Meier survival and Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard functions 
Years of work Beginning total Failures Survivor function Standard error Cumulative hazard Standard error 20 86945 19 0.9989 0.0001 0.0011 0.0001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 20953 362 0.9408 0.0014 0.0608 0.0015 38 18164 422 0.9189 0.0017 0.0840 0.0019 39 15431 394 0.8954 0.0021 0.1095 0.0023 40 13184 623 0.8531 0.0026 0.1568 0.0030 41 10509 435 0.8178 0.0030 0.1982 0.0036 42 8705 508 0.7701 0.0035 0.2565 0.0044 43 7076 373 0.7295 0.0039 0.3093 0.0052 44 5820 325 0.6888 0.0043 0.3651 0.0060 45 4751 333 0.6405 0.0047 0.4352 0.0072 46 3723 238 0.5995 0.0051 0.4991 0.0083 47 3010 173 0.5651 0.0054 0.5566 0.0094 48 2459 145 0.5318 0.0058 0.6156 0.0106 49 1995 110 0.5024 0.0061 0.6707 0.0118 50 1672 228 0.4339 0.0067 0.8071 0.0149 51 1232 103 0.3976 0.0071 0.8907 0.0170 52 999 79 0.3662 0.0073 0.9697 0.0192 53 819 63 0.3380 0.0076 1.0467 0.0215 54 684 38 0.3193 0.0078 1.1022 0.0233 55 583 54 0.2897 0.0080 1.1948 0.0265 56 473 32 0.2701 0.0082 1.2625 0.0291 57 386 32 0.2477 0.0084 1.3454 0.0325 58 324 22 0.2309 0.0086 1.4133 0.0356 59 261 15 0.2176 0.0087 1.4708 0.0386 60 218 23 0.1946 0.0090 1.5763 0.0444 61 167 17 0.1748 0.0093 1.6781 0.0508 62 123 9 0.1620 0.0095 1.7512 0.0564 63 98 10 0.1455 0.0099 1.8533 0.0650 64 79 11 0.1252 0.0102 1.9925 0.0773 65 62 35 0.0545 0.0091 2.5570 0.1228 Note: The standard error for the Kaplan-Meyer estimate is the one given by Greenwood (1926). 
 
4.2. Semi-parametric analysis 
In this section, estimates of the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard 
models are presented. As discussed in Section 3, parametric analysis offers an 
advantage over the non-parametric methods, as it allows predicting the 
probability distribution of retirement by means of a set of additional 
covariates. In what follows the joint effect of various individual and labour 
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market characteristics affecting the probability of exiting into retirement is 
analysed. 
In Table 4, the estimated results from the Cox’s proportional hazard model 
are reported.15 The reported coefficients are hazard ratios.16 As explained in 
Section 3, a ‘shared’ frailty model is employed where the sub-groups are 
selected according to the number of countries in our sample (26). Thus, the 
model assumes that observations share group-specific, unmeasured, risk 
factors that prompt exits into retirement. As the frailty terms explicitly 
account for the extra variance associated with such risk factors, we can 
evaluate the hypothesis that 0=θ  to determine whether the choice of treating 
unobserved heterogeneity in the model is motivated. Supporting our 
concerns, the nested model under 0=θ  is always preferred to the reference 
non-frailty model according to the relevant LR test at the bottom of Table 4.  
Focusing on the regression results, the estimated hazard ratios indicate that 
there is no significant difference in the patterns of retirement between 
residents in the euro area (EA) and EU non-euro area countries. Moreover, the 
results suggest that the onset of the global financial crisis (2009) significantly 
increased flows into retirement. However, it is only when controlling for 
household disposable income and personal benefits that we achieve this 
result. When omitting the income variables from the regression, the result 
rather suggest that the hazard to retire decreased in 2009.17 The importance of 
the income variables for the result of the 2009 crisis on the hazard to retire                                                         15 A sensitivity analysis is performed in the Appendix showing that the results from the Cox proportion model are robust also when using full parametric models. 16  A coefficient of, e.g., 0.5 for a dummy variable is interpreted as lowering the exit rate from employment to retirement by a half. For a continuous variable, a coefficient of 0.5 implies that a one unit change in the variable is associated with a hazard rate of 1/2 as large and an n unit change in the variable is associated with a hazard rate (1/2)n as large. 17 The finding of a decreasing hazard to retire in 2009 is consistent with the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates reported in Figure A1 (Appendix). However, it should be borne in mind that the Kaplan-Meier estimates are not conditional on any covariates. Thus, the information extracted from a plain visual inspection of the plots in Figure A1 is very limited, compared to the semi-parametric analysis. 
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may stem from the fact that wealth for people eligible to retirement generally 
became at risk in 2009, with income to cover basic expenses in retirement 
running short because of the financial crisis.18 
From Table 4 we also find that setting a minimum retirement age reduces the 
hazard to retire. This can be interpreted in the light of providing workers with 
a yardstick or a minimum number of years with payment to social security 
before they become eligible to retire.  
Beyond more institutional factors, the participation of elderly workers is also 
affected by a wide set of socio-economic and environmental variables such as 
gender (female) and occupation groups (occ. group). While we find increased                                                         18 In the present context it is however difficult to distinguish labour market quits from lay-offs. 
Table 4: Cox regressions 
Variable Hazard ratio (Std. Err.) Variable Hazard ratio (Std. Err.)       EA 1.030 (0.320) Income variables   Dummy 2009 1.301*** (0.049) Disposable income 0.982 (0.025) Minimum retirement age 0.896*** (0.012) Old age benefits 2.028*** (0.085) 
   Unemployment benefits 1.864*** (0.117) 
Individual characteristics   Disability benefits 2.806*** (0.230) Female 1.479*** (0.075) Sickness benefits 1.134 (0.088) Married 1.024 (0.082)    Skilled 1.676*** (0.073) Interaction   Part-time 0.127*** (0.061) Part-time x disp. income 1.171*** (0.056) 
      
Occupational group   Health variables   2.Occ. group 0.656*** (0.033) Health 1.682*** (0.201) 3.Occ. group 0.958 (0.048) Health(-1) 1.460** (0.224) 4.Occ. group 0.924 (0.055)    5.Occ. group 0.853** (0.053) Partner characteristics      2.Partner unemployed 1.384*** (0.134)    3.Partner retired       1.065* (0.041)    4.Partner inactive 1.155*** (0.055)    Partner's health 0.706*** (0.083) 
Statistics      
θ 0.577 (0.150)    LR test (frailty terms) Prob>=chi-bar-sq. = 0.000    Wald χ2 1305.892    Prob > χ2 0.000    Log-likelihood -32839.825    Number of groups 26    Observations 53,490    Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Table A3 for data and definitions 
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movements toward retirement among female workers, we do not find any 
statistical difference as to whether a person is married or not.  
Besides, the personal characteristics typically associated with higher 
education (skilled) are not found to generally lead workers to work longer 
than their less-educated counterparts. This is somewhat consistent with the 
findings in Autor and Dorn (2009) reporting an inverted U-shape relationship 
between skills and changes in the mean age, suggesting that occupations in 
the bottom and top deciles of the skill distribution tend to work on average 
less than people with middle-skill jobs.  
Working (or having worked) part-time plays an important role in reducing 
the hazard to retire. This is consistent with the recent evidence (see, inter alia, 
Machado and Portela, 2012) that retirement is no longer likely to be a discrete 
choice: with some workers exiting from full-time employment and making 
use of flexible working schemes before withdrawing completely from the 
labour market.  
Furthermore, some occupation groups are found to have important 
explanatory power. Compared to the category of professionals, technicians 
and associate professionals (occ. group =1), those belonging to the category 
including service, skilled agricultural and fishery workers (occ. group =2), and 
those with elementary occupations (occ. group =5), show a significantly lower 
probability to retire. Albeit with such sectoral categories  it is not possible to 
distinguish between private or public sector employees (see Table A3, in the 
Appendix), these results probably reconcile with the idea that formal workers 
are expected to retire earlier than casual workers and self-employed, typically 
belonging to some of the categories listed above (i.e., elementary occupations, 
agriculture and fishing).  
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Looking at the income variables, household disposable income ultimately does 
not exert an influence on retirement decisions in our sample. Nevertheless, 
the interaction between working part-time and disposable income (part-time x 
disp. income) significantly reduces employment duration. This result suggests 
that there exist a level effect of income when employment is not full-time, or, 
the exposure to the current (or past) level of income is higher when not 
working full-time (see also Blake, 2007; Montalto, 2001).  
Income supports are very likely to influence the labour supply of the aged as 
well, given that unemployment schemes may induce older workers to seek 
part-time jobs or to withdraw earlier from the labour market.19 The variation 
in age of eligibility for social security benefits (old age, disability and/or sickness 
benefits) can particularly affect the sustainability of the retirement status. It 
should be borne in mind that the effect of pension schemes and benefits are 
not exogenous to income, as pension scheme produce inter-temporal 
substitution effects (i.e. with a postponement of the retirement age today in 
favour of an expected higher pension return tomorrow). In this setting, 
receiving positive old age benefits or unemployment benefits significantly 
increases retirement decisions, in line with the idea that social insurance 
schemes such as disability benefits significantly increase flows out of 
employment (see estimated hazard ratios in Table 4).20 Consistently, sickness 
                                                        19 On the other hand, as argued by Boskin and Hurd (1978), if higher social security taxes are needed to finance the increasing burden of an ageing population, this could create disincentives for people to reduce their labour force participation and withdraw earlier from the labour market. 20 Note that, in the EU-SILC, unemployment benefits also include (see also Table A3):  
(i) Partial unemployment benefits compensating for the loss of wages or salary due to formal short-time working arrangements, and/or intermittent work schedules, irrespective of their cause, and where the employer/employee relationship continues. 
(ii) Early retirement for labour market reasons, including periodic payments to older workers who retire before reaching standard retirement age due to unemployment or to job reductions caused by economic measures such as the restructuring of an industrial sector or of a business enterprise. These payments normally cease when the beneficiary becomes entitled to an old age pension.  Thus, receiving unemployment benefits may unveil information about part-time working schemes and early retirement patterns in some cases. 
Ted Aranki & Corrado Macchiarelli 
19    
benefits, representing cash benefits that replace (in whole or in part) loss of 
earnings during temporary inability to work, are not found to significantly 
affect the hazard to retire.  
In line with the literature, our findings also point to the fact that health is an 
important determinant of retirement, as healthier people are found to 
continue to work and retire later (see inter alia, Bound, 1991; Jones et al., 2008; 
2010; Deschryvere,  2005; Disney et al., 2006).21 Overall, however – as 
highlighted by a growing literature (e.g., Jones et al. 2008; 2010) – measures of 
health are subject to an endogeneity problem. There are several reasons on 
why to expect an endogeneity bias when using self-reporting measures of 
health. First, self-reported health is based on subjective assessments which 
may not be comparable across individuals (Lindeboom, 2006; Lindeboom and 
van Doorslaer, 2004). Second, there is an obvious simultaneity problem 
between self-reported health and the labour market status, given that health 
problems may represent a legitimate reason for a person in the working age to 
be outside the labour market (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Kreider, 1999). 
Finally, for some individuals there may be incentives to report health 
problems as a mean to obtain disability benefits (i.e. the so-called ‘disability’ 
route into retirement, see Blundell et al., 2002).  
Many studies in the literature typically use an instrumental variable 
approach, by adopting more ‘objective’ measures of health to instrument self-
reported health measures. Along these lines, an ‘individual health stock’ is 
normally constructed, where self-reported health is regressed on a set of 
specific health problems (see also, Griliches, 1974; Fuller, 1987). As such 
questions concerning specific health problems are not available in the EU-
SILC, we take into account the possibility that anticipated retirement may 
justify the reporting of bad health by, first, including a dummy whenever                                                         21 For a survey of the literature see Deschrivere (2005). 
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individuals receives disability benefits. This allow us to control for possible 
‘disability routes’ into retirement (Blundell et al., 2002). Further, to assess the 
robustness of our previous findings, alternative health measures are 
employed, along with the usual set of covariates. More specifically, in Table 5 
measures arguably less prone to reporting bias than self-reported health are 
employed, such as a measure of health limitations (limit) and chronic diseases 
(see Jones et al., 2008; 2010).  
Using alternative health measures has generally a size effect on the 
coefficients of interest while it does not affect their sign and / or significance. 
Thus, independently of the proxy employed, health status is an important 
determinant of retirement decisions.  
Table 5: Cox regressions using alternative health measures  Hazard ratio (Std. Err.) Hazard ratio (Std. Err.) Hazard ratio (Std. Err.)        Health 1.682*** (0.201)     Health(-1) 1.460** (0.224)     Limit   1.210*** (0.076)   Limit(-1)   1.213*** (0.083)   Chronic     1.050 (0.041) Chronic(-1)     0.919** (0.036)        Wald χ2 1305.892 1304.008 1282.473 Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 Log-likelihood -32839.825 -32842.068 -32851.073 Number of groups 26 26 26 Observations 53,490 53,490 53,490 Note: All regressions include a full set of covariates as in Table 4. The whole results are available upon request from the authors. Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Table A3 for data and definitions. 
To assess whether a change in labour market status from employment to 
retirement is more influenced by a (negative) shock to an individual health or 
a level effect via slow health deterioration, a ‘health shock’, or a lagged health 
variable, is included in the regression, following the discussion in Jones et al. 
(2010). It seems plausible that the health lag is more informative about the 
decision to retire than current health as it normally takes time to entirely 
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adjust to health limitations and to allow an individual to gauge his reduced 
ability to work over time. The use of health lag has the great advantage of 
reducing any endogeneity bias by observing the timing before the decision to 
effectively retire (see Jones et al., 2010). In Table 4, the effect of the health 
shocks is significant. This is broadly consistent with the evidence obtained 
when using alternative health shock measures (see Table 5).22 
Occupation statuses and health effects are important also as regard to 
individuals’ partners. For instance, predictions regarding a joint labour 
market decision of old couples can derive from a family labour supply model 
like the one proposed by Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) were couples 
maximise a single utility function subject to a household budget constraint 
with pooled income. The analysis in this paper confirms the prediction that 
having a partner retired significantly increases the hazard to retire, compared 
to having a partner employed. This is in line with the idea that the primary 
reason for partners to retire together is shared preferences / substitution effect 
for leisure against working longer, with each partner valuing more retirement 
when the partner is retired as well (see Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; 
Hurd, 1990; Michaud, 2003). Moreover, individuals with partners reporting 
bad health are generally associated with a lower probability to retire 
compared to individuals with partners reporting better health status (see also 
Wu, 2003). 
 
                                                        22 Health is also important as concern the interaction with occupation groups (occ. group). Such an interaction term suggests that those who work in craft and related trades workers (including heavy works such as extraction and building) have higher incentives to retire due to (reported) health problems. For sake of brevity these results are not reported in Table 4, but are available upon request from the authors. 
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4.2.1. Early-retirement decisions 
Until now the analysis has focused on individuals retiring. However, 
understanding the motivations to retire earlier (before the legal retirement 
age), compared to standard retirement patterns, represent an important factor 
of analysis. This can be important, especially in the light of assisting the 
formulation of policies that might encourage early retirees to stay at work.  
Cox estimates of early retirement decisions are reported in Table 6. Although 
the results are similar to those presented for the full sample, significant 
differences do exist. In particular:  
• Working (or having worked) with a part-time contract does not play a 
significant role in reducing the hazard to retire early. This finding, 
combined with the result in Table 4, may suggests that a gradual 
reduction in hours worked over the last segment of the working life 
can contribute to increased employment of older workers, beyond the 
legal retirement age.  
• Higher disposable household income and state / health benefits – 
including those temporary in nature, such as sickness benefits – 
significantly increase the hazard to retire early, compared to standard 
retirement decisions. This suggests that the choice of pre-retiring 
should be considered in the light of the expected retirement needs, or 
the evaluation of whether the accumulated income / wealth prior to 
retiring is considered adequate to sustain the future retirement status. 
In this vein, early retirements are more sensible to income effects 
(including short term benefits) compared to retiring after the legal 
retirement age. Along the same lines, and opposite to the results in 
Table 4, the interaction term between part time and income does not 
exert any significant effect on early retirement decisions. 
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Table 6: Cox regressions, early retirement sample 
Variable Hazard ratio (Std. Err.) Variable Hazard ratio (Std. Err.)       EA 0.854 (0.273) Income variables   Dummy 2009 1.285*** (0.061) Disposable income 1.082** (0.036) Minimum retirement age 0.848*** (0.015) Old age benefits 3.330*** (0.156) 
   Unemployment benefits 1.637*** (0.112) 
Individual characteristics   Disability benefits 2.291*** (0.202) Female 1.373*** (0.084) Sickness benefits 1.318*** (0.121) Married 1.135 (0.112)    Skilled 1.914*** (0.102) Interaction   Part-time 1.201 (0.751) Part-time x disp. income 0.962 (0.059) 
      
Occupational group   Health variables   2.Occ. group 0.746*** (0.045) Health 2.383*** (0.338) 3.Occ. group 0.832*** (0.049) Health(-1) 1.765*** (0.325) 4.Occ. group 0.796*** (0.054)    5.Occ. group 0.784*** (0.058) Partner characteristics      2.Partner unemployed 1.379*** (0.146)    3.Partner retired 1.110** (0.052)    4.Partner inactive 1.101* (0.060)    Partner's health 0.682** (0.109) 
Statistics      
θ 0.604 (0.157)    LR test (frailty terms) Prob>=chi-bar-sq. = 0.000    Wald χ2 1475.982    Prob > χ2 0.000    Log-likelihood -22076.371    Number of groups 26    Observations 51,304    Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Table A3 for data and definitions 
• Finally, focusing on the individual health status, we show that – 
analogously to the findings in Table 4 – people with health problems 
are generally found to discontinue employment and retire earlier. 
However, the health coefficient for people retiring below the legal 
retirement age is twice as big the one reported in Table 4. This points to 
the fact that, among all the institutional measures scrutinized (long 
term and short term benefits, minimum retirement age, etc.), none 
could be sufficient alone if individuals withdraw earlier from the 
labour market due to a weakening of their health. Particularly for early 
retirees, policies aimed at advance retirement by improving the health 
of the workforce and at keeping those who experience health problems 
active may be essential.  
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4.3. Frailty terms 
To control for the fact that some countries may be more prone to retirement 
than others for unobserved reasons not captured by our covariates, a ‘shared’ 
frailty model has been used. The terms for the 26 EU member states from our 
‘shared’ frailty model are shown in Figure 2. Particularly, the panel on the 
left-hand side of the figure show the estimated frailty terms from the 
regression in Table 4. The right-hand side panel of Figure 2 shows results the 
results from the regression in Table 6. Cases above the 0 line are the most 
failure-prone ones.  
The results, in Figure 2, provide a mixed picture with some large euro area 
countries lying below the zero line (i.e. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands) while 
others, e.g. France and Belgium, lying slightly above zero. These results 
confirm our previous findings, suggesting that the hazard to retirement is 
mixed and cannot be reconciled with membership to the euro area. For the 
early retirement regression, the picture changes only slightly with some 
countries moving around the zero line (e.g. France, Italy and Denmark).  
Although, there are no significant differences across regions there are clear 
differences across countries. On average, however, more prone to retirement 
countries are also those who are more prone to retire earlier. 
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Figure 2: Frailty terms for EU member states, retirement (top) and early retirement (bottom)  
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5. Conclusions 
Schemes to curb public expenditures by increasing the minimum retirement 
age represents important arguments of discussion in the bargaining set up 
(see also Hicks, 2011). However, understanding in greater details the 
motivations for retirements could assist the formulation of policies that might 
encourage the return of retirees to employment or decrease the incentives of 
withdrawing earlier from the labour market.  
Workers are often assumed to dace the choice of leaving the labour market 
based on their own preferences (Fengler, 1975; Hayward, Grady and 
McLaughlin, 1988) and / or based on the trade-off between market work 
versus home production or leisure (for an overview see Bazzoli, 1985; Blöndal 
and Scarpetta, 1999; Duval, 2003; Gruber and Wise, 2002; Meghir and 
Whitehouse, 1997). In practice, however, different constraints can influence 
the labour force participation decision of the elderly.  
In this paper a wide set of socio-economic and environmental variables is 
employed to study exits into retirement in the EU. Based on longitudinal data 
from the Eurostat Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), over 
the period 2004-2009, we analyse the probability of retiring at a given age, 
given that the person has not retired yet. A number of stylized facts are 
documented. 
First, after controlling for (un)measured risk factor affecting the hazard to 
retire in each country, we find no significant differences, on average, in the 
patterns of retirement between residents in the euro area and the EU non-euro 
area countries. Second, shifts into retirement have increased during the onset 
of the 2009 economic and financial crisis, when controlling for income effects. 
Income and benefits are found to be important also as regards early 
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retirement decisions, when accumulated income / wealth is presumably 
lower, compared to retiring beyond the legal retirement age. In the same vein, 
flexible working arrangements are found to be particularly important for 
workers to keep working beyond the legal retirement age. Thus, making use 
of partial working arrangements could modify retirement patterns towards 
postponing the age of withdrawing from the labour market.  
Finally, this analysis shows overall that, among all the institutional measures 
scrutinized (state/health benefits, minimum retirement age, etc.), none could 
be sufficient alone if individuals withdraw from the labour market before the 
legal retirement age due to a weakening of their health. Particularly, for early 
retirees, policies aimed at improving the health of the workforce and at 
keeping people who experience health problems active may be essential.  
All in all, by jointly testing for a wide set of factors affecting retirement 
decisions in the EU, the results of this paper illustrate that adequate policies to 
retain old workers at work can only be appropriately formulated once the 
determinants of retirement decisions are fully understood and modelled. In 
our knowledge, this paper represents a first attempt in this direction for the 
whole EU.  
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Appendix 
                  
Figure A1: Survival function for the transition from employment into retirement for separate groups 
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Note: Test results, i.e. log-rank (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959) and Wilcoxon (Breslow, 1970; Gehan, 1965), for the equality of the 
different survivor functions suggest that the equality of the survivor functions is rejected. 
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Figure A2: Survival function for the transition from employment into retirement by country 
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Sensitivity analysis of the model: full-parametric regressions 
In order to investigate if the estimated Cox coefficients are robust, in what 
follows we present results from a full-parametric model.23 As discussed in 
Section 3.1, when applying parametric models it is necessary to specify a 
certain functional form of the hazard rate that fits the data. The likelihood-
ratio or Wald test can be used to discriminate between groups of nested 
models (Cleves et al., 2010). In the present case, the results of the likelihood-
ratio test indicate that the generalized gamma distribution fits well.24 
However, when models are not nested, likelihood-ratio or Wald test tests are 
not appropriate and an alternative statistic has to be used. The most common 
is the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Akaike (1974) proposed a method 
penalising each models’ log-likelihood to reflect the number of parameters 
being estimated and then comparing them.25  
In Table A1 an overview of the computed AIC scores is presented. There are 
slight differences in the value of the log-likelihood function between the 
models. Although the log-logistic distribution scores best, the results reveal 
that the Weibull model is the preferred specification in the proportional 
hazard form.26 Note, also that the Weibull model has virtually the same AIC 
                                                        23 One of the assumptions underlying the Cox model is the proportional hazards assumption. Evaluating the robustness of the estimated Cox proportional hazard models, it is shown (from the results in Section 4.2) that the joint Wald test of all coefficients equal to 0 is rejected at a standard significance level in all cases. However, the test of the proportional hazards assumption using Schoenfeld’s (1982) residuals is rejected. Since we are more interested in the parameter estimates than the shape of the hazard in this paper, the Cox proportional hazard model is, nevertheless, well-suited to this goal. 24 We start from a generalized gamma model for evaluating and selecting an appropriate parametric model. We test the hypothesis that the ancillary parameters for the generalized gamma distribution (with standard deviation) kappa = 0 (model is log-normal); kappa = 1 (model is Weibull); and kappa = 1 and sigma = 1 (model is exponential). By testing the appropriate restrictions, it is found that we can reject the log-normal, the Weibull and the exponential distribution against the gamma for all samples. 25 The AIC compares the likelihood scores while taking into account the degrees of freedom used in each model. AIC = -2* log-likelihood + 2 * (k + c), where k is the number of model covariates and c the number of model-specific distributional parameters. 26 Since the Weibull can be specified in both the proportional hazard and accelerated failure time form we can compare it to other accelerated failure time distributional forms. 
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scores as the log-logistic one.27 Furthermore, as shown in the non-parametric 
analysis above, the hazard of exiting into retirement exhibits a monotonically 
increase. Thus, based on these combined assessment, the more reasonable 
Weibull distribution is employed.28 Estimates using the log-logistic 
distribution do not produce any relevant differences compared to the Weibull 
estimates, suggesting that the selection effect of using distributions other than 
the Weibull is limited. 
In Table A2 the time ratios from the estimated – Weibull distributed – 
accelerated failure time model are presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         27 This is the case also for the generalized gamma distribution. 28 The Weibull model assumes a baseline hazard of the form h0(t) = ptp-1 exp(β0), where p is some ancillary shape parameter estimated from the data, and the scale parameter is parameterised as 
exp(β0). The Weibull distribution can provide a variety of monotonically increasing or decreasing shapes of the hazard function, and their shape is determined by the estimated parameter p.  
Table A1: Model selection for full parametric regressions Distribution (metric) Log likelihood k c AIC Ranking Whole sample (retirement) Exponential (PH, AFT) -10001 23 1 20049 6 Weibull (PH, AFT) -2275 23 2 4599 3 Gompertz (PH) -2544 23 2 5138 4 Log-normal (AFT) -3445 23 2 6941 5 Log-logistic (AFT) -2226 23 2 4503 1 Generalized gamma (AFT) -2255 23 3 4563 2 Note: The models are estimated assuming gamma distributed frailty or heterogeneity. 
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Table A2: Full parametric regressions 
Variable Time ratio (Std. Err.) Variable Hazard ratio (Std. Err.)       EA 1.001 (0.037) Income variables   Dummy 2009 0.971*** (0.004) Disposable income 1.001 (0.003) Minimum retirement age 1.012*** (0.002) Old age benefits 0.925*** (0.004) 
   Unemployment benefits 0.926*** (0.007) 
Individual characteristics.   Disability benefits 0.880*** (0.008) Female 0.955*** (0.006) Sickness benefits 0.988 (0.009) Married 0.996 (0.009)    Skilled 0.944*** (0.005) Interaction   Part-time 1.319*** (0.075) Part-time x disp. income 0.979*** (0.006) 
      
Occupational group   Health variables   2.Occ. group 1.057*** (0.006) Health 0.947*** (0.013) 3.Occ. group 1.002 (0.006) Health(-1) 0.961** (0.017) 4.Occ. group 1.006 (0.007)    5.Occ. group 1.014* (0.007) Partner characteristics      2.Partner unemployed 0.964*** (0.011)    3.Partner retired 0.990** (0.004)    4.Partner inactive 0.979*** (0.005)    Partner's health 1.047*** (0.014) 
      
   Constant 23.550*** (2.559) 
Statistics      ln(p) 8.521*** (0.084)    
ln(θ) 0.589** (0.153)    LR test (frailty terms) Prob>=chi-bar-sq. = 0.000    Wald χ2 1215.992    Prob > χ2 0.000    Log-likelihood -1407.851    Number of groups 26    Observations 53,490    Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Table A3 for data and definitions 
The results of the Weibull model are basically consistent with those of the Cox 
proportional hazard regression in Table 4. An important difference to bear in 
mind when interpreting the results is that in proportional hazard models 
(such as Cox’s) the estimates are interpreted as the effect on the employment 
exit rate; while accelerated failure time models analyse the effect on the 
employment period.29 
                                                         29 Additionally, it should be noted from Table A2 that the Wald test on the ancillary shape parameter (p) indicates that we can reject the hypothesis that the hazard is a constant, suggesting a monotone increasing behaviour over time. The hypothesis that ln(p)=0 is rejected at the 1% significance level for all observations. The parameter p is the ‘shape’ parameter, as it defines the shape of the distribution. If p= 1, then the hazard is constant. For other values of p, the Weibull hazard is not constant; it is monotone decreasing when p < 1 and monotone increasing when p > 1. 
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Table A3: Variables used in the estimation 
Variable Definition Dependant variables  
Employment duration The amount of time that an individual spends in employment before entering into retirement. 
Employment duration, early The amount of time that an individual spends in employment before entering into early retirement (before the legal retirement age). Explanatory variables  Activity Main activity status during the income reference period. If the main activity is not ‘a job or business’, the status is self-defined. The main activity status during the income reference period is ‘at work’ if the respondent worked (or was in paid apprenticeship or training) the majority of weeks during the income reference period. If a person spends the same number of weeks in different activities, priority should be given to economic activity (‘main activity job or business’) over non-economic activity and over inactivity. 
Employed Equals 1 if the individual is at work. A person is at work if he works at least 1 hour during the reference week. 
Unemployed Equals 2 if the individual is unemployed 
Retired Equals 3  if the individual is in retirement or early retirement 
Inactive Equals 4 if the individual classifies himself as any other inactive person. Change activity Most recent change in the individual’s activity status. The variable records changes in the individual activity status over the last interview (or last 12 months for the first year of data collection). 
Employed - retired Equals 1 if the individual changed from employment to retirement. 
Unemployed - retired Equals 2 if the individual changed from unemployment to retirement. 
Retired - employed Equals 3 if the individual changed from retirement to employment. 
Retired - unemployed Equals 4 if the individual changed from retirement to unemployment. 
Retired - inactive Equals 5 if the individual changed from retirement to inactive other than retirement. 
Inactive - retired Equals 6 if the individual changed from inactivity other than retirement to retirement. EA Equals 1 if a country belongs to the euro area. Dummy 2009 Equals 1 if year of the survey equals 2009. Minimum ret. age Countries' minimum retirement age according to OECD (2011). Female Equals1 if the interviewed is of female gender. Married Equals 1 if the interviewed is married. Skilled Equals1 if the interviewed has high education according to the highest ISCED level attained. This includes first stage of 
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tertiary education (not leading directly to an advanced research qualification) and second stage of tertiary education (leading to an advanced research qualification. Occ. Groups The variable conforms to the ISCO-88 (COM) International Standard Classification of Occupations. 
1 Equals 1 if the individual belongs to legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals or clerks. 
2 Equals 2 if the individual belongs to service workers and shop and market sales workers, skilled agricultural and fishery workers.  
3 Equals 3 if the individual belongs to craft and related trades workers. 
4 Equals 4 if the individual belongs to plant and machine operators and assemblers.  
5 Equals 5 if the individual has a elementary occupation. Part-time Equals 1 if the individual works or worked part-time based on a self-defined economic status. Disposable income (Log) total disposable household income. This includes the sum for all household members of gross personal income components (gross employee cash or near cash income; gross non-cash employee income; company car; employers’ social insurance contributions; gross cash benefits or losses from self-employment (including royalties); value of goods produced for own consumption; pensions received from individual private plans; unemployment benefits; old-age benefits; survivor' benefits, sickness benefits; disability benefits and education-related allowances plus gross income components at household level (imputed rent; income from rental of a property or land; family/children related allowances; social exclusion not elsewhere classified; housing allowances; regular inter-household cash transfers received; interests, dividends, profit from capital investments in unincorporated business; income received by people aged under 16) minus (employer’s social insurance contributions interest paid on mortgage; regular taxes on wealth; regular inter-household cash transfer paid; tax on income and social insurance contributions). Part-time X disp. income Interaction term between part-time and disposable income. Old age benefits Equals 1 if the individual receives non-zero old age benefits. By definition, the old age function refers to the provision of social protection against the risk linked to old age, loss of income, inadequate income, lack of independence in carrying out daily tasks, reduced participation in social life, and so on. Old age benefits cover benefits that: provide a replacement income when the aged person retires from the labour market, or guarantee a certain income when a person has reached a prescribed age. Disability benefits Equals 1 if the individual receives non-zero disability benefits. Disability benefits refer to benefits that provide an income to persons below standard retirement age whose ability to work and earn is impaired beyond a minimum level laid down by legislation by a physical or mental disability. Disability is the full or partial inability to engage in economic activity or to lead a normal life due to a physical or mental impairment that is likely to be either permanent or to persist beyond a minimum prescribed period.  Sickness benefits Equals 1 if the individual receives non-zero sickness benefits. Sickness benefits refer to cash benefits that replace in whole or in part loss of earnings during temporary inability to work due to sickness or injury. Being temporary in nature, those 
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include only paid leave or cash benefits in case of self-reported sickness or injury or that of a dependent child. Unempl. benefits Equals 1 if the individual receives non-zero unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits refer to benefits that replace in whole or in part income lost by a worker due to the loss of gainful employment; provide a subsistence (or better) income to persons entering or re-entering the labour market; compensate for the loss of earnings due to partial unemployment; replace in whole or in part income lost by an older worker who retires from gainful employment before the legal retirement age because of job reductions for economic reasons; contribute to the cost of training or re-training people looking for employment; or help unemployed persons meet the cost of travelling or relocating to obtain employment. Health Equals 1 if the individual assesses his health is 'very bad'. The measurement of self-perceived health is, by its very nature, subjective. The notion is restricted to an assessment coming from the individual and not from anyone outside that individual.  The reference is to health in general rather than the present state of health, as the question is not intended to measure temporary health problems. It is expected to include the different dimensions of health, i.e. physical, social and emotional function and biomedical signs and symptoms. It omits any reference to an age as respondents are not specifically asked to compare their health with others of the same age or with their own previous or future health state. Partner's activity Main activity status of the partner (if any) during the income reference period. See Activity definition 
Employed Equals 1 if the partner is at work. 
Unemployed Equals 2 if the partner is unemployed 
Retired Equals 3 if the partner is in retirement or early retirement. 
Inactive Equals 4 if the partner is inactive. Partner's health Equals 1 if each individual's partner (if any) assesses his health to be 'very bad'. See Health definition. Alternative health measures  Limit Equals 1 if the individual reports limitations in activities because of health problems. The purpose of the instrument is to measure the presence of long-standing limitations, as the consequences of these limitations (e.g. care, dependency) are more serious. The period of at least the last 6 months is relating to the duration of the activity limitation and not of the health problem. The answer to this question is yes (1 or 2) if the person is currently limited and has been limited in activities for at least the last 6 months. Chronic Equals 1 if the individual reports to suffer from any a chronic (long-standing) illness or condition. 
 Note: See also the EU-SILC’s Guidelines.   
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